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Structural primingMeanings of basic expressions can be enriched by considering what the speaker could have
said, but chose not to, that is, the alternatives. We report three priming experiments that
test whether there are shared enrichment mechanisms across a diverse range of linguistic
categories. We find that quantifier, number, and ad hoc enrichments exhibit robust priming
within their categories and between each other. Plural enrichments, in contrast, demon-
strate within-category priming but no between-category priming. Our results demonstrate
that (1) enrichment typically thought of as pragmatic or semantic can be primed in the
same way as syntactic structures and (2) there are mechanisms that are shared across dif-
ferent enrichment categories, and that some phenomena (e.g., plurals) are excluded from
this class. We discuss the implications of our findings for psychological models of enrich-
ment, theories of individual categories of enrichment, and structural priming.
 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is anopenaccess article under the CCBY-
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Understanding a sentence requires mapping the words
that were uttered to appropriate meanings and then pie-
cing them together according to a grammar. But it also
requires considering words the speaker did not utter, but
could have. The listener must consider the alternatives to
what the speaker said and incorporate them into the mes-
sage expressed by the spoken words. Consider the exam-
ples below.1. A: Have you met Dave, Jane’s new boyfriend? He’s
intelligent and handsome.
B: Well, he’s intelligent.
) he’s not handsome
2. There’s a pen on the table.
) There’s a pen and nothing else on the table
3. Some of the children are in the classroom
) Not all of the children are in the classroom
4. I’ve got two children.
) I’ve got two children but no more than two.
5. John’s essay was acceptable.
) John’s essay was acceptable but not excellent.In (1), the meaning of B’s words is that Dave is clever. How-
ever, in the right context, B’s utterance communicates
more than this. Speaker A would be licensed to infer that
B believes Dave is not handsome. In order to derive the
additional meaning, Speaker A might reason as follows.
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natives), such as, ‘‘Yes, you’re right.” or ‘‘Yes, he’s intelli-
gent and handsome”. Then, she could reason that since B
did not say those alternatives, and B was in a position to
make that judgment (e.g., B had met Dave), B must not
believe the alternatives. Put simply, if B had meant any
of these alternatives she could have said them, and since
she did not, it can be inferred that she does not believe
them. The enrichment shown in the other examples can
all be derived using similar reasoning: In (2), the speaker
could have described the other objects on the table but
because s/he did not, the listener can infer that there are
no other objects on the table; in (3), the speaker could have
used other, more informative quantifiers instead of some,
such as all, so not all can be derived; in (4), the alternatives
to two are three, four, five, etc. and so these can be negated
to give no more than two; and in (5), John’s essay could
have been good or excellent but since the speaker did not
say that it was, the listener can infer that it is neither good
nor excellent.
The classic reasoning above is inspired by Grice (1975),
who viewed such enrichments as a natural consequence of
speakers and listeners cooperating in dialog. Recent
debates have tried to evaluate the respective role of gram-
matical and domain general reasoning processes to derive
such inferences (see, Chierchia, Fox, and Spector (2012), for
a strikingly unorthodox position). But as a starting point,
most current proposals agree that they form a natural class
of phenomenon, known as scalar implicatures, involving
the competition with alternatives. In this paper we ques-
tion the extent to which different categories of enrichment
should be grouped together on mechanistic grounds. We
test whether there are shared reasoning processes that
apply across enrichments, as in the reasoning sketched
above, or whether each enrichment, or category of enrich-
ments, uses a set of specialized procedures.
Our approach was to test whether enrichments can be
primed across expressions. If different sorts of enrichments
can prime each other, there must be an abstract mecha-
nism that is shared between them. By testing which
enrichments prime each other and which don’t, we can
specify what the common mechanism might be.
Categories of enrichment
We are concerned with enrichments that arise via the
use of alternatives; hence we refer to the general phenom-
ena as enrichment-via-alternatives (EVAs).1 The EVAs shown
in Examples (1)–(5) involve a variety of different linguistic
forms. They were chosen to illustrate how EVAs function
in general but also because they are representative of three
categories of EVAs around which there is debate about
whether a common mechanism is used for their derivation.1 We use the term EVA rather than implicature because we prefer to
remain theory-neutral about how EVAs arise. While EVAs are often
described using a form of Gricean reasoning, there is a lively debate as to
whether this reasoning really is a by-product of rational conversations or
has to be understood as part of the language decoding system (see, e.g.,
Chierchia et al., 2012). We need not take part in this debate, once we
recognize that all current accounts rely on the same two key pieces: a set of
alternatives and a computational system that deal with these alternatives.These categories form the basis of our hypothesis and our
experimental materials. Here we introduce the different
categories.
Quantifiers
Sentences involving quantifiers such as some are gener-
ally taken to have at least two interpretations: a weak
reading, and a strong reading. The weak reading is typically
consistent with an at least meaning, as in (6) below:(6) If some of the children are in classroom, I’ll shut
the window.Here, it is clear that if at least one, and possibly all, of the
children are in the classroom, the window will be closed.
This can be compared with the strong meaning, illustrated
in (3), which conveys an only-like reading. In (3) the
speaker likely means that at least one child, but not all of
them, are in the classroom. The argument from Horn
(1972), Gazdar (1979), Levinson (1983) and many others
since is that the weak reading can be enriched by combin-
ing its basic meaning with the negation of some alterna-
tive. In the some case, the weak reading, at least one, is
combined with the negation of the alternative constructed
by replacing somewith all, to therefore generate the at least
one, but not all, reading.
Quantifier enrichments are seen as prototypical exam-
ples of EVAs in the theoretical (e.g., Horn, 1972;
Levinson, 1983) and the experimental literature (e.g., Bott
& Noveck, 2004; Breheny, Katsos, & Williams, 2006;
Degen & Tanenhaus, 2015; Huang & Snedeker, 2009;
Grodner, Klein, Carbary, & Tanenhaus, 2010). We included
quantifiers as a distinct category of EVAs in our experi-
ments to act as a kind of benchmark against which other
(potential) EVAs could be compared.
Numerals
As with quantifiers, sentences with number words can
also be described as having a weak and a strong meaning.
The strong meaning corresponds to an exact sense, as in
(4), and corresponds to the most prominent meaning of
cardinal terms. The weak (or at least) meaning shows up
in examples such as (7); here the speaker uses ‘‘two” to
mean two or more (at least two), since having three chil-
dren would not prevent the applicant from receiving
support.(7) Parents with two children will be eligible for
financial support.The relationship between the weak and strong number
meanings can be seen in the same way as that between
the weak and strong quantifiers (e.g., Horn, 1972, 1989).
Just like quantifiers, the numbers form an entailment scale,
in which numbers at the upper end of the scale entail those
at the lower end (that is, whenever sentences with num-
bers at the upper end of the scale are true, so are sentences
with numbers at the lower end). If the numbers can be
thought of as having a lexical meaning that corresponds
to at least N, that is, a weak meaning, then a strong mean-
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the negation of its alternatives, that is, N + 1, N + 2, N + 3,
etc. For example, the strong meaning of ‘‘two” can be
formed by combining its weak meaning (the lexical mean-
ing), at least two, with not at least three (=less than 3), not at
least four (=less than 4), etc. to give at least two but less than
3, i.e. the exact meaning.
Numbers and quantifiers are thus plausibly derived in
the same way. They also share a number of distributional
properties, such as being suspended under negation
(Gazdar, 1979; Horn, 1989; Chierchia, 2004). But they also
exhibit divergent behavior. For example, consider (8) and
(9) (from Huang, Spelke, & Snedeker, 2013) below(8) Everyone who ate some of their berries felt fine.
(9) Everyone who ate two of their berries felt fine.In (8), some typically receives aweak reading (eating at least
some of the berries) whereas as in (9), two typically receives
a strong reading (eating exactly two is fine, but eating more
than that probably isn’t). This has led some researchers to
suggest accounts of number meanings in which the strong
meaning (the exact meaning) is the lexically determined
meaning, and the weak meaning is derived through further
computations (e.g., Breheny, 2008; Carston, 1998; Geurts,
2006; Horn, 1992; Sauerland, 2003), quite the opposite of
the EVA account suggested above in which the weak mean-
ing is stored lexically, and the strong meaning is derived
through enrichment. This work suggests that numbers are
not like quantifier EVAs, possibly not EVAs at all, and that
they involve at least some distinct psychological processes
(for a more extensive review, see Kennedy (2013) and
Spector (2013)).
Ad hoc. Many expressions can be enriched using alterna-
tives that are entirely contextually determined, so that
the consequent enrichment is made on an ad hoc basis.
For example, the not handsome enrichment that arises in
(1) is entirely dependent on A’s previous statement about
Jane’s new boyfriend, Dave, being intelligent and hand-
some. Had A described Dave’s qualities as being intelligent
and rich, a different enrichment would have arisen from B’s
statement; namely that Dave was not rich.
Ad hoc enrichments share many of the same properties
as the quantifier and the numeral enrichments
(Hirschberg, 1991). Most importantly, the same type of
ambiguity arises between weak and strong meanings. In
particular, in the absence of a context, ‘‘he’s intelligent”
may simply convey a weak meaning, something like at
least intelligent, which includes neither the not handsome
nor the not rich enrichment.
Ad hoc EVAs look very similar to that of the numbers
and the quantifiers but there could also be a dichotomy
between the processing of quantifiers/numbers on the
one hand and ad hoc EVAs on the other, since there are
important differences between the two – the nature of
the alternatives in particular is necessarily context depen-
dent for ad hoc EVAs, while it is less so for quantifiers and
numbers (4 and all are privileged alternatives for 3 andsome, in a way that at most 3 and not all can never be,
regardless of the context).
Shared and distinct enrichment mechanisms
The foregoing discussion introduced three commonly
studied categories of EVAs. The EVAs are similar in that a
trigger expression can give rise to two distinct but related
interpretations: the strong interpretation and the weak
interpretation. Moreover, in each case, the strong interpre-
tation is plausibly derived from the weak interpretation
using the same set of mechanisms. Although there are
many explanations for how the enrichment arises, most
involve something like the following, which we refer to
as the ‘‘core account”: (i) the listener computes the weak
meaning of the phrase, (ii) recognizes that an alternative
phrase could have been used, but that it wasn’t, (iii)
negates the alternative and combines it with the weak
meaning (assuming the speaker is judged to be knowl-
edgeable). Modern and developed theories can be found
in van Rooij and Schulz (2004), Sauerland (2004), Franke
(2011), Chierchia et al., (2012), a.o.
Our study tests whether the mechanisms described by
the core account are indeed shared across EVAs, and to
what extent. At one extreme, the same mechanisms could
be used to derive quantifier, number and ad hoc enrich-
ments. While there is variability across EVAs in the rate of
enrichments (e.g., van Tiel, van Miltenburg, Zevakhina, &
Geurts, 2014), this could be explained by differences in
the frequencies of the alternatives, or some other factor
linked to the idiosyncratic properties of the trigger expres-
sion. At the other extreme, each EVA could have its own dis-
tinct set of mechanisms. For example, ad hoc EVAsmight be
derived using procedures very similar to the core account;
numbers might have a lexical entry corresponding to the
strong (exact) interpretation, which is then modified to
derive the weak interpretation; and the quantifiers might
have both strong and weak meanings lexicalized, with the
appropriate meaning on any given occasion determined
by frequency and probabilistic factors, much like standard
polysemy (see Tomlinson, Bailey, and Bott (2013) for a sug-
gestion along these lines). Another possibility is that there
are multiple versions of the mechanisms described by the
standard account, one for each EVA: mechanisms special-
ized in retrieving and negating ad hoc alternatives; mecha-
nisms specialized in retrieving and negating number
alternatives; and mechanisms specialized in retrieving
and negating quantifier alternatives. Finally, between the
extremes, some of the mechanisms might be shared and
other distinct. For example, all three EVAs could use the
same process for negating the alternatives and combining
the result with the basic meaning, but the retrieval of the
alternatives may be different: for ad hoc EVAs it necessarily
involves context specific processes while the (standard)
alternatives for quantifiers and numbers may not.
Existing data is not able to distinguish between these
possibilities. Despite the similarities in the distributions
of numbers, quantifiers and ad hoc EVAs, which point to
a shared set of mechanisms, there are also dissimilarities,
such as that between the numbers and the quantifiers
(e.g., Breheny, 2008), which point to distinct mechanisms.
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evidence can categorically answer questions about shared
psychological mechanisms. The basic problem is that there
are multiple psychological mechanisms that can give rise
to similar kinds of distributional (or psychological) behav-
ior. As an example consider the exact vs at least accounts of
numbers considered above. Here, there are different repre-
sentational processes hypothesized to account for very
similar distributions. Indeed, even if the distributions were
identical it would still be possible for distinct psychological
mechanisms to underpin quantifier and number enrich-
ment. Similarly, one may observe differences between
EVAs but this cannot exclude that some mechanisms be
shared. For example, the developmental literature now
converges towards saying that variability in how children
interpret different EVAs concern their knowledge of alter-
natives, while the rest of the system could be unaltered
(Barner, Brooks, & Bale, 2011; Tieu, Romoli, Zhou, &
Crain, in press). The issue is that the data has been correla-
tional - correlations between the distribution of different
EVAs and correlations between processing patterns -
whereas to establish whether there are shared mecha-
nisms requires establishing whether enrichment of one
expression can cause the enrichment of another. In the
reminder of the article we present three experiments that
test this. Our goal is primarily to identify whether there are
any levels of shared representation that mediate inferenc-
ing across the EVAs considered above.
Priming enrichment
The current study used a structural priming paradigm
(e.g., Raffray & Pickering, 2010). Structural priming occurs
when participants adopt a particular linguistic structure
on one trial (the prime) and then adopt the same structure
on a subsequent trial (the target). For example, in Bock
(1986), participants repeated a prime sentence that could
be in active form (e.g., ‘‘One of the fans punched the ref-
eree”) or passive form (e.g., ‘‘The referee was punched by
one of the fans”), and then had to describe a picture. Partic-
ipants were more likely to describe a picture in passive
form after they had repeated a passive prime sentence
than an active prime sentence. Similar effects have been
shown in a huge range of production tasks, including writ-
ten production (e.g., Pickering & Branigan, 1998) and dia-
log (Branigan, Pickering, & Cleland, 2000), as well as
single participant description tasks (e.g., Raffray,
Pickering, Cai, & Branigan, 2014). Priming can also facilitate
comprehension in sentences (Thothathiri & Snedeker,
2008), and influence the final analysis of globally ambigu-
ous sentences, such as scopally ambiguous sentences (Raf-
fray & Pickering). Our task uses a sentence–picture
matching task, modeled on Raffray and Pickering, in which
participants are constrained to derive either a strong or a
weak interpretation of an expression on a prime trial,
and then make a judgment about whether to enrich the
expression on a subsequent target trial. Priming of enrich-
ment would be shown by a greater proportion of strong
interpretations of the target sentence after a strong prime
than after a weak prime.
The results of priming experiments have been used to
argue for the existence of representations that areabstracted away from superficial properties of the sentence
(e.g., Bock, 1986; Pickering & Ferreira, 2008). The basic pre-
mise of structural priming is that people have language rep-
resentations that are constructed from part-of-speech
forms, such as nouns, verbs, and prepositions and con-
stituents organized from those forms, such as noun phrases,
verb phrases, propositional phrases, and that producing or
comprehending a sentence activates particular construc-
tions. These constructions then remain active across trials
so that the next time a suitable sentence is encountered,
the primed construction has an advantage over other
potential structures, and the sentence is produced or com-
prehended according to the primed structure.
The logic of our approach is similar to that described
above. If a strong prime interpretation of one EVA sentence
causes a greater number of strong target interpretations of
a different category, this would be evidence for EVA mech-
anisms that operate beyond sentence specifics, and indeed
beyond EVA categories. For example, the core account
assumes a mechanism that uses the negation of the alter-
natives, as in not handsome in (1) or not all in (2). If it is
the same mechanism that negates the alternatives across
different categories of EVA, it should be possible to prime
the mechanism, such that the probability of negating alter-
natives (and so deriving the enrichment) is greater after a
strong prime trial than after a weak prime trial.
Experimental overview
In all of our experiments participants saw a sentence
and had to match the sentence with one of two pictures.
The sentences referred to the presence of symbols in a
set, such as ‘‘All of the shapes are diamonds.” In the exper-
imental trials, the sentences invited enrichment. However,
because the enrichment was optional, participants could
interpret the sentence in its basic or enriched form. This
meant that the sentences could have either a weak mean-
ing (without enrichment) or a strong meaning (with
enrichment). For a given sentence, three types of pictures
were possible: (a) false pictures, that made both readings
false, (b) weak pictures, that made the weak reading true
but the strong reading false, and (c) strong pictures that
made both readings true. Pictures were arranged in various
combinations to form prime trials and target trials. There
were two types of prime trials. First, weak primes, which
displayed a false picture and a weak picture, so that partic-
ipants would click on the weak picture and access the
weak reading. Second, strong primes, which displayed a
weak picture and a strong picture. We reasoned that par-
ticipants would access the strong reading (the one that
makes the two pictures different in a relevant way) and
click on the strong picture. The prime trials were designed
to force a particular interpretation of the sentence. There
were strong and weak trials for each of the EVA categories
used in the experiment. Figs. 1 and 3 show example prime
sentence–picture pairings.
In the target trials, participants read another experi-
mental sentence and saw two more pictures. One of the
pictures was a weak picture, and the other picture was a
box with ‘‘Better Picture?” written inside it. Participants
were instructed that the ‘‘Better Picture” option should
Prime Target
Some of the symbols are clubs
Some of the symbols are stars
Strong
Weak
Some
Some of the symbols are diamonds
Strong
Weak
There are four squaresNumber4
There are four cks
There are four triangles
Strong
Weak
There is a ckAd hoc
There is a triangle
There is a dot
Fig. 1. Example stimuli for Experiment 1. Participants see a prime followed by a target. The prime (left column) consists of a sentence and two pictures, and
the target (right column) one picture and the ‘‘Better Picture?” option. Each panel illustrates stimuli from one of the three EVA categories: some, number4,
and ad hoc. Strong trials (upper half of the panel) and weak trials (lower half of the panel) are shown for each EVA category. Within-category trials consist of
prime and target from the same category whereas between-category trials consist of prime and target from a different category.
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ciently captured the sentence meaning (we modeled the
‘‘better picture” method on Huang et al. (2013)). Figs. 1
and 3 show examples of the target trials. We expected that
participants should click on the weak picture if they
accessed the weak reading, and opt for the ‘‘Better Picture”
option if they accessed the strong reading. Target trials
immediately followed prime trials. Consequently, priming
of the enriched meaning would be observed when a partic-
ipant selected the strong interpretation option more often
after the strong prime than after the weak prime (and vice
versa).Each of the experiments used sentences from multiple
EVA categories. For example, Experiment 1 used some sen-
tences and number sentences. There were prime and target
sentences for each category. There were therefore two dif-
ferent forms of priming, within-category priming, in which
prime and target were of the same type, such as a some
prime preceding a some target, and between-category
priming, in which prime and target were of different types,
such as a some prime and a number target.
Evidence of shared mechanisms across EVAs would be
shown by significant between-category priming. Evidence
of within-category priming is also of interest, however,
Within priming
SOME
SOME
Within priming
NUM4
NUM4
Within priming
ADHOC
ADHOC
Between priming
SOME
NUM4
Between priming
SOME
ADHOC
Between priming
NUM4
ADHOC
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
Strong Weak Strong Weak Strong Weak Strong Weak Strong Weak Strong Weak
Prime type
P
ro
po
rti
on
 S
tro
ng
 re
sp
on
se
s
Fig. 2. Experiment 1 results. Priming is shown by the difference between the strong and weak bars for each panel. Within-category priming is shown in the
left three panels, and between-expression priming in the right three panels. Note that the between-expression priming groups are pooled across priming
direction (e.g., ‘‘SOME NUM4” is the combination of some? number4 and number4? some trials).
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would demonstrate that at least some enrichment mecha-
nisms were primeable, that is, remain active across time
and linguistic material. We would consequently have
stronger grounds for arguing that there were no shared
enrichment mechanisms if we were not to observe
between-category priming. Second, a comparison of the
within-category effect to the between-category effect
could provide information about which mechanisms were
being primed. For example, if only shared mechanisms
were primed, then there should be no difference between
within and between-category priming effects.2 The some and the number/ad hoc sentence frames differed in that the
EVA trigger was in subject position for some sentences whereas it was in
object position for numbers sentences. One likely effect of this would be to
elevate the rate of enrichment for some sentences and to suppress them for
number sentences (see e.g., Breheny et al., 2006). This is useful in our case
because the two types of scale probably have different enrichment rates
(some having a low enrichment rate and the numbers a high enrichment
rate) and the difference in sentence structure brought the two enrichment
rates to the center of the scale. A further effect might be to make the
sentences relatively dissimilar, thereby reducing between-category prim-
ing. However, since we did find priming (as the upcoming results
demonstrate), the difference in sentence structure makes our result even
stronger.Experiment 1
In Experiment 1 we tested some, number and ad hoc
EVAs. Examples are shown in Fig. 1. Within-category trials
involved a prime and target from the same category, that
is, some? some, number4? number4, and ad hoc? ad
hoc. Between-category trials involved a prime and target
from different categories, such as some? number4, or ad
hoc? some. If enrichment can be primed at all, we would
expect within-category priming. If the numbers, some
and ad hoc EVAs share enrichment mechanisms we would
expect them to prime each other, so that a strong some
prime, for example, leads to a greater proportion of strong
number responses.Method
Participants
Two hundred participants were recruited using Amazon
Turk. Of these, 13 were removed because they did not
declare English as their native language. The data from
the remaining 187 were used in the experiment.
Materials
Each trial involved a sentence presented above two pic-
tures. Participants had to match the sentence to one of the
pictures. For experimental trials, the sentence was con-
structed using one of three frames: (i) Some of the symbols
are [symbol] (ii) There are four [symbol] (iii) There is a
[symbol].2 The symbols were one of diamonds, clubs, ticks,
spades, hearts, squares, stars, circles, notes, or triangles.
Prime Target
There are diamonds
There are dots
Strong
Weak
Plurals
There are hearts
Strong
Weak
There are six hearts
There are six squares
There are six clubs
Number6
Fig. 3. Example stimuli from Experiments 2 and 3. The upper panel shows stimuli from number6 EVAs and the lower panel from plurals.
L. Bott, E. Chemla / Journal of Memory and Language 91 (2016) 117–140 123Pictures consisted of rectangles containing either sym-
bols or the text ‘‘Better Picture?” For prime trials, both pic-
tures contained symbols. For target trials, one picture
contained symbols and the other, ‘‘Better Picture?”
Pictures with symbols could be strong, weak or false.
Weak prime trials involved a weak and a false picture,
and strong prime trials involved a strong and a weak
picture.
For some trials, strong pictures involved three symbols
of one type and six of another type. The predicate in the
sentence always matched the minority symbol type. For
example, if the sentence was, ‘‘Some of the symbols are
diamonds,” the strong picture involved three diamonds
and six of another symbol, e.g., spades. Weak pictures
involved nine symbols of the type that matched the pred-
icate. False pictures involved nine symbols of a type that
did not match the predicate. For number4 trials, strong pic-
tures involved four symbols that matched the predicate,
and weak pictures involved six symbols that matched the
predicate. False pictures involved two symbols that
matched the predicate. Finally, for ad hoc trials, weak pic-tures contained two symbols, one of which was consistent
with the predicate, and strong pictures contained a single
symbol that was consistent with the predicate. False ad
hoc pictures contained two different symbols, neither of
which matched the predicate.
We also included filler trials linked to each prime-target
combination. These involved sentences that were more
informative than the basic expressions used in the experi-
mental trials (given the relevant weak picture). There were
all sentences (an alternative to some), e.g., ‘‘All the symbols
are diamonds,” which was more informative given the
weak some picture; six sentences (an alternative to four),
e.g., ‘‘There are six symbols;” and double sentences (an
alternative to ad hoc), e.g., ‘‘There is a diamond and a
square.” Each occurred in three forms (1) a weak picture
with symbols that did not match the predicate in the sen-
tence, and a ‘‘Better Picture?” option (2) a weak picture
with symbols that matched the predicate, and a ‘‘Better
Picture?” option, and (3) a weak picture with symbols that
matched the predicate, and a strong picture. These items
served to highlight that alternative to the participant,
124 L. Bott, E. Chemla / Journal of Memory and Language 91 (2016) 117–140thereby elevating the overall rate of enrichment, and to
prevent the participant adopting response strategies with-
out fully processing the sentence.
In addition to the ad hoc filler trials we included ad hoc
bias trials at the start of the experiment. The bias trials
were designed to elevate the overall proportion of enrich-
ment responses (in pilot studies without the bias trials we
found that participants responded at a very low rate of
enrichment for the ad hoc trials). Bias trials involved the
standard ad hoc sentence, ‘‘There is a [symbol],” and
occurred in two forms. In one form, the sentence was
paired with a symbol picture and a ‘‘Better Picture?”
option, and in the other, there were two symbol pictures.
In the ‘‘Better Picture?” trials, one picture contained a sym-
bol that did not match the predicate and the other was the
‘‘Better Picture?” option. In the symbol picture trials, one
picture was the strong ad hoc picture (a single symbol that
matched the predicate) and the other was a picture with a
single symbol that did not match the predicate. The idea
behind the bias trials was to facilitate participants in imag-
ining what the appropriate ‘‘better picture” might be for
the enriched expression.
Design
There were three types of enrichment category (some,
number4, ad hoc). For each, there were two prime types,
a strong prime trial and a weak prime trial, and a target
trial. There were consequently 3 (enrichment category) 
2 (prime type) = 6 distinct prime trials and 3 (enrichment
category) target trials. We fully crossed these to form 18
distinct prime-target combinations. Of these, 6 involved
primes and target from the same enrichment category
(within-expression trials), such as, some prime? some tar-
get, and 12 involved primes and target from different cat-
egories (between-expression trials), such as some prime?
number4 target.
There were two primes for every target, so that the
experimental units were triplets of trials, such as, strong
some prime, strong some prime, some target. This was done
to boost the effect of the prime. There were 4 examples of
each prime-target combination. Consequently there were 4
(examples)  18 (prime-target combinations)  3 (tri-
plets) = 216 experimental trials.
There were a further 36 filler trials, 12 per enrichment
category, with equal numbers of the three filler types
described above, and 16 ad hoc bias trials.
Randomisation and counterbalancing
All participants saw the same set of trials. The symbol in
the sentence and target image or in the false image was
picked at random, with replacement across trials. These
trials, in a triplet of prime-prime-target or individual fillers
where then administered in a random order to each
participant.
For prime trials there was a correct response option. For
weak primes this was the weak picture. For strong primes
this was the strong picture but for an indirect reason: in
the presence of both a weak picture and a strong picture,
participants could not make a non-arbitrary choice solely
based on the truth conditions of the weak interpretation
which is true in both cases, hence the strong reading is afavored option in that it provides a non-arbitrary way to
resolve the task. The position of the correct response was
counterbalanced across trials so that for half the trials it
was on the right and for half it was on the left. Further-
more, for half the trials the correct response was the same
side as the previous trial and for half the trials it was on the
opposite side. For target trials there was no correct answer
but the ‘‘Better Picture?” option was always on the right.Procedure
Participants were instructed to click on the picture that
‘‘best matched the sentence.” They were given two simple
examples, one involving many, as in ‘‘Many of the symbols
are stars,” and one involving above, as in ‘‘There is a dia-
mond above a square.” The latter involved the ‘‘Better Pic-
ture?” option. They were instructed to select this option if
they thought there was ‘‘a picture that better matched the
sentence.”
Responses were selected by clicking with the mouse on
a button beneath the pictures.Results
Data treatment
Each target trial was preceded by two prime trials.
Without participants correctly responding to the prime tri-
als we could not be sure that they had derived the correct
interpretation of the prime sentence. We therefore
removed all target responses that were not preceded by
the two correct prime responses (in common with
Raffray and Pickering (2010), and many others). In this
experiment, 875 out of 13,360 target responses were
removed because of incorrect prime responses. Of the
875, 279 were ad hoc targets, 273 were number targets
and 323 some targets.Analysis procedure
We analyzed our data by modeling response-type like-
lihood using logit mixed-effect models (Jaeger, 2008). The
random effects structure included random intercepts and
slopes for all repeated measures factors (we had no
between-subject factors). Analyses were conducted using
the lme4 (Bates, Maechler, & Bolker, 2011) and languageR
libraries (Baayen, 2011) for the R statistics program (R Core
Team, 2014). b values, standard errors, Z-values, and p-
values are shown in the tables accompanying the experi-
ment together with R pseudo-code describing the models.
Treatment and sum coding were used as appropriate and
the reference levels are stated in the text. The Appendix
shows raw means for each cell in the design.
In all of our experiments we start with an analysis
involving all of the data, in which we assessed within-
expression priming, between-expression priming and the
interaction between the two. To gain a more detailed pic-
ture we then restricted the analysis to within-expression
trials only and between-expression trials only. The depen-
dent measure was the log odds of choosing a strong over a
weak response on target trials.
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Fig. 2 shows the data for Experiment 1. The figure is
divided into six panels. The first three show responses to
targets when the prime and target were of the same cate-
gory, i.e., within-category priming trials. There is one panel
for some, one for number4 and one for ad hoc targets
respectively. The separate bars within each panel refer to
the value of the prime, either strong or weak. The large dif-
ference between the strong and the weak primes suggest a
substantial within-category priming effect. The second
three panels show responses to targets where the target
and prime are of a different type. Here, each panel refers
to one of three between-category prime-target combina-
tions, someM number4, someM ad hoc, or number4M ad
hoc. For these panels, we combined targets from the two
sorts of relevant between-category trials, i.e., we ignored
the direction of the prime-target combination (the raw
mean for each cell of the design is shown in the Appendix).
Thus the someM number4 panel consists of responses to
number4 targets from some (prime)? number4 (target)
trials combined with some targets from number4
(prime)? some (target) trials. Similarly, the someM ad
hoc panel consists of ad hoc targets from some? ad hoc tri-
als and some targets from ad hoc? some trials, and the
number4M ad hoc panel consists of number4 and ad hoc
targets from the number4? ad hoc trials and the ad
hoc? number4 trials respectively. The between-category
panels show a difference between strong and weak trials,
that is, between-category priming, although the effect is
much smaller than that for the within-category primes.
We report three analyses. The first assessed whether
EVAs can be primed at all, and if so, whether this effect
occurs at the within and between-category levels. The
model included a within/between factor that distinguishedTable 1
Experiment 1 results.
b
Overview Prime ⁄WithBet + (1 + Prime ⁄WithBet |subje
(Intercept) 0.5
Prime 0.5
WithBet 0.1
Prime: WithBet 0.4
Within simple Prime 0.9
Between simple Prime 0.1
Within detail Prime ⁄WithCat + (1 + Prime ⁄WithCat |subje
(Intercept) 2.0
Prime 1.2
WithCatNUM4 2.0
WithCatSOME 1.8
Prime: WithCatNUM4 0.1
Prime: WithCatSOME 0.1
Between detail Prime ⁄ BetCat + (1 + Prime ⁄ BetCat|subject)
(Intercept) 0.6
Prime 0.1
BetCatSOMEADH 0.0
BetCatSOMENUM4 0.8
Prime:BetCatSOMEADH 0.0
Prime:BetCat SOMENUM4 0.0
Note. R-pseudo code shown in the first line of every section. Prime = priming f
within, between). WithCat =within expression category factor (3 levels: some,
someM number4, someM ad hoc, number4M ad hoc).within-category trials from between-category trials (2
levels: pooled responses from some? some, number4?
number4, and ad hoc? ad hoc; and pooled responses from
some? number4, number4? some, some? ad hoc, ad
hoc? some, number4? ad hoc, ad hoc? number4), and
a prime factor that distinguished strong primes from weak
primes (2 levels: strong, weak). Table 1 reports statistical
details of the analysis. A model using sum contrasts for
both factors showed a significant effect of prime, b = 0.56,
p < .001, such that a strong prime increased the rate of
strong responding overall, a significant effect of within/be-
tween, b = 0.126, p < .001, such that the rate of strong
responses was higher in between-category trials than
within-category trials, and an interaction between the
two, b = 0.43, p < .001, such that the effect of the prime
was greater in the within-category trials. A model with
the same structure but using treatment contrasts for the
within/between factor and sum contrasts for the prime
factor was used to investigate simple effects. This showed
that significant priming occurred at the within-category
level, b = 0.99, p < .001, and, independently, at the between
category level, b = 0.13, p < .001. In short, we observed
priming of EVAs at the within-category level and the
between category level.
To assess these effects in more detail we broke down
the data into within-category trials (Panels 1–3 of Fig. 2)
and between-category trials (Panels 4–6 of Fig. 2) and con-
ducted separate analyses on each. For the within-category
analysis we tested a model with within-category group (3
levels: some? some, number4? number4, ad hoc? ad
hoc), and prime (2 levels: strong, weak) as factors, in which
prime was coded with sum contrasts and target category
with treatment contrasts (with ad hoc as reference).
There was a significant effect of prime, b = 1.24, p < .001,S.E. Z p-value
ct)
94 0.198 2.991 .003
63 0.034 16.342 <.001
26 0.029 4.284 <.001
30 0.033 13.177 <.001
93 0.059 16.950 <.001
33 0.033 4.082 <.001
ct)
88 0.255 8.185 <.001
39 0.109 11.374 <.001
68 0.195 10.588 <.001
23 0.157 11.598 <.001
74 0.166 1.046 .296
38 0.137 1.007 .314
91 0.204 3.384 <.001
45 0.058 2.509 .012
54 0.089 0.611 .540
89 0.112 7.915 <.001
69 0.079 0.873 .383
78 0.088 0.888 .374
actor (2 levels: strong, weak). WithBet = within/between factor (2 levels:
number4, ad hoc). Betcat = between expression category factor (3 levels:
3 To test whether the failure to observe a significant interaction was due
to experimental insensitivity, we computed the Bayes Factor for the
interaction term. We conducted a Baysian repeated measures ANOVA on
the between category data, with prime (strong vs weak), and between
category group (someM number4, someM ad hoc, or number4M ad hoc) as
factors, using JASP (Love et al., 2015). We used the JZS prior (Rouder,
Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 2009), with r set a priori to the default
value, r = .707. The Bayes Factor for the interaction term was 0.053, which is
‘‘substantial” evidence in favor of the null hypothesis (Dienes, 2011, 2014).
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ences across categories in overall rates of strong responses.
There were significantly more strong responses in the
number4 category than the ad hoc category, b = 2.07,
p < .001 and more in the some category than in ad hoc cat-
egory, b = 1.82, p < .001, but there were no differences
between number4 and some categories however, 0.25,
p = .14. The interaction between prime and category was
significant for number4 vs some, b = 0.31, p = .03 but not
for number4 vs ad hoc nor for some vs ad hoc, |b|’s < 0.17,
p’s > .31.
To analyze the between-category data we formed three
groups corresponding to the three possible between-
category prime-target groups: someM number4, some -
M ad hoc and number4M ad hoc, corresponding to Panels
4–6 respectively in Fig. 2. Each group was the pooled
responses from the two relevant target trials (i.e., groups
were independent of direction). For example, the
someM number4 group consisted of some (prime)? num-
ber4 (target) trials and number4(prime)? some (target)
trials. These groups formed three levels of one factor in
the model, between category, and prime (2 levels: strong,
weak) was another. Between category was coded with
treatment contrast (number4M ad hoc as reference) and
prime as sum contrasts. Replicating the results from the
overview model, we found a significant effect of prime
type, b = 0.15, p < .001, such that strong primes led to a
greater rate of enrichment. There were no significant inter-
actions of prime with between-category group, |b|’s < 0.15,
p’s > .082.
Discussion
Our findings reveal that enrichment can be primed: The
decision about whether to enrich an expression was influ-
enced by whether the expression was enriched on the pre-
ceding trial. Clearly, the mechanisms involved in
computing enrichments are sensitive to recent activity.
We were also able to identify different sorts of priming.
In particular, we found within-category priming, between
category priming, and greater within-category priming
than between-category priming. The between-category
priming effect illustrates that there are shared mechanisms
across the EVA categories, yet the greater within-category
priming result demonstrates that there is also some addi-
tional effect of EVA specific mechanisms.
The priming effect between ad hoc expressions and
some/number4 helps eliminate an explanation for the
someM number4 priming effect. According to some
authors (e.g., Horn, 1972), the alternatives for quantifier
and number expressions are lexically defined (the alterna-
tives are the stronger elements on the same semantic
scale). A reasonable explanation for the someM number4
priming effect was therefore that there was a special
mechanism that retrieved the alternatives from memory,
and that this mechanism was primed. For example, con-
sider a strong some prime trial followed by a number4 tar-
get trial. The strong some interpretation would have meant
activating the retrieval mechanism to obtain the alterna-
tive, all. If this mechanism had remained active into the
target trial, it would have been more likely to retrievethe number alternative, thereby elevating the rate of
enrichment. The ad hoc EVAs provide a test of this account.
Since they do not have lexically defined alternatives (the
alternative is defined entirely by the context), they could
not share a lexical retrieval mechanism with some/num-
bers. Consequently, if a lexical retrieval mechanism were
being primed, we would have expected reduced or non-
existent priming between some/number 4 and the ad hoc
EVAs (i.e., a between-category by prime interaction). Since
we did not,3 it is more parsimonious to assume that the
same (non-lexical) mechanism is the source of the
between-category priming effect.
Interestingly, while the size of the priming effects was
similar across EVAs, the overall levels of enrichment dif-
fered. In particular, there was a much lower rate of enrich-
ment for ad hoc EVAs than quantifiers or numbers. Thus,
while the source of the between priming effect in Experi-
ment 1 was a mechanism shared across ad hoc, numbers
and quantifiers, there may nonetheless be differences in
how the ad hoc and the other EVAs are computed, such
as the computation of their alternatives (e.g., Katzir,
2007). We discuss this further in the General discussion.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 was similar to Experiment 1 except that
we used different EVA categories. The number sentences
were number4 sentences, just as before, and number6 sen-
tences, which involved six, such as, ‘‘There are six dia-
monds” (see Fig. 3). We also included some sentences.
There were within-category trials that involved a prime
and target from the same category, such as some? some,
and between-category trials that involved a prime and tar-
get from different categories, such as someM number4,
just as there were in Experiment 1.
We had two aims. The first was to test an explanation
for the within-category findings we observed in Experi-
ment 1. Since the image for the weak prime picture had
the same form as the image for the target picture, the
priming effect could have been a consequence of partici-
pants being biased towards selecting a picture that was
visually most similar to their previous selection. In a weak
target trial, participants could select a picture that had an
identical form to the picture that they selected in the weak
prime trial, whereas in a strong trial, they could not (and so
were obliged to choose the ‘‘Better Picture?” option). For
example, consider the number4 trials (see Fig. 1). The weak
prime consisted of a picture involving six symbols,
together with the false picture, and the target consisted
of another picture that contained six symbols, together
with the ‘‘Better Picture?” option. Now, if participants
adopted a strategy of choosing the picture most similar
L. Bott, E. Chemla / Journal of Memory and Language 91 (2016) 117–140 127to their selection on the previous trial, they would select
the six symbol picture following the weak prime (both
had six symbols), and the ‘‘Better Picture?” option follow-
ing the strong prime. This explanation could explain the
within-category priming effect (but not the between cate-
gory effect).
To test this hypothesis, we constructed our materials so
that the weak number4 picture (six symbols) was the same
as the strong number6 picture (six symbols). An image
similarity account makes two predictions about responses
to the number4 target trials: (1) participants should chose
the weak picture (six symbols) more often after the num-
ber6 strong prime trial (six symbols), than after the num-
ber4 strong trial (four symbols) and (2) participants
should chose the weak picture (six symbols) equally often
after the weak number4 prime (six symbols) as after the
strong number6 prime (six symbols).
Our second aim was to test a potential ‘‘lexical boost” to
the priming effect. Research into syntactic priming has
found that greater priming occurs when there is high lexi-
cal overlap between the prime and target sentences (e.g.,
Pickering & Branigan, 1998; Branigan et al., 2000; Cleland
& Pickering, 2003). For example, Pickering and Branigan
found a greater priming effect when prime and target used
the same verb than when it did not. A similar effect in our
study could clarify the mechanisms responsible for EVA
priming effects, just as it has in the syntactic priming liter-
ature. We therefore compared trials in which prime and
target had the same number (‘‘four”? ‘‘four” and
‘‘six”? ‘‘six”) with those that had different numbers
(‘‘four”? ‘‘six” and ‘‘six”? ‘‘four”). Greater priming inFig. 4. Experiment 2 results. Sethe same number trials compared to the different number
trials would indicate a lexical boost.
Method
Participants
Ninety-six participants were recruited using Amazon
Turk, all of whom declared English as their native
language.
Materials
The number4 and some items were the same as those
used in Experiment 1. Number6 items were constructed
in similar way to number4 items except that six, nine,
and four symbols were used for the strong, weak and false
picture respectively. The filler sentences for number6 were
nine sentences e.g., ‘‘There are nine diamonds.” All other
aspects of the design were the same as Experiment 1.
Results
Data treatment
We removed responses to incorrect primes, just as in
the previous experiment. 487 target responses were
removed out of a total of 6403. Of the 487, 142 were num-
ber4 targets, 176 were number6 targets and 173 some
targets.
Analysis
Fig. 4 shows the proportion of strong responses to
target trials in Experiment 2. Priming is shown by thee Fig. 2 for explanation.
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each panel. Just as in Experiment 1, there is a large
within-category effect (Panels 1–3) and a smaller
between-category priming effect (Panels 4–6).
We first report an overview analysis, just as we did in
Experiment 1. The model included a within/between factor
(2 levels: pooled responses from some? some, num-
ber4? number4, and number6? number6 vs pooled
responses from someM number4, someM number6, num-
ber4M number6), and a prime factor (2 levels: strong,
weak). Table 2 reports statistical details. There was a sig-
nificant effect of prime, b = 0.66, p < .001, such that a strong
prime increased the rate of strong responding, a significant
effect of within/between, b = 0.25, p < .001, such rate of
strong responding was greater in between-category groups
than within category groups, and an interaction between
the two, b = 0.42, p < .001, such that the effect of the
prime was greater in the within-category trials. Simple
effects analysis showed that significant priming occurred
at the within-category level, b = 1.08, p < . 001, and at the
between category level, b = 0.23, p < .001. Our results
therefore confirm the between and within priming
observed in Experiment 1.Table 2
Experiment 2 results.
b
Overview Prime ⁄WithBet + (1 + Prime ⁄WithBet|subj
(Intercept) 1
Prime 0
WithBet 0
Prime: WithBet 0
Within simple Prime 1
Between simple Prime 0
Within detail Prime ⁄WithCat + (1 + Prime ⁄WithCat|subj
(Intercept) 2
Prime 1
WithCatNUM6 0
WithCatSOME 1
Prime: WithCatNUM6 0
Prime: WithCatSOME 0
Between detail Prime ⁄ BetCat + (1 + Prime ⁄ BetCat|subject)
(Intercept) 1
Prime 0
BetCatSOMENUM4 0
BetCatSOMENUM6 0
Prime:BetCat SOMENUM4 0
Prime:BetCat SOMENUM6 0
Lexical boost Prime ⁄Within + (1 + Prime ⁄Within|subjec
(Intercept) 1
Prime 0
WithBet 0
Prime: WithBet 0
Image similarity 1 PrimeCat + (1 + PrimeCat|subject)
(Intercept) 3
PrimeCat 0
Image similarity 2 PrimeCat + (1 + PrimeCat|subject)
(Intercept) 1
PrimeCat 0
Note. R-pseudo code shown in the first line of every section. Prime = priming f
within, between). WithCat =within expression category factor (3 levels: some, n
analysis). Betcat = between expression category factor (3 levels: someM numbe
factor (2 levels: number6, number4).Next we consider the within-category effects in more
detail. Here, we used only the within-category data (Panels
1–3 of Fig. 2). The model included within-category group
(3 levels: number4? number4, number6? number6,
and some? some), and prime (2 levels: strong, weak) as
factors, with treatment contrasts for category group (num-
ber4 as reference) and sum contrasts for prime. There was
a significant effect of prime, b = 1.48, p < .001, consistent
with the overview analysis. There were also differences
between the within categories in overall rates of strong
responses. There were more strong responses in number4
than some, b = 1.26, p < .001, more strong responses in
number6 than some, b = 0.86, p = .0030, and marginally
more strong responses for number4 than number6,
b = 0.40, p = .058. There were no significant interactions
between prime and category, b’s < 0.36, p’s > .080.
The third analysis tested between-category priming. As
in Experiment 1, the model included prime (2 levels:
strong, weak) and between category group (3 levels:
someM number4, someM number6, number4M
number6) as factors and used only between-category
data. Prime was coded with sum contrasts and
between category group with treatment contrastsS.E. Z p-value
ect)
.339 0.321 4.165 <.001
.657 0.053 12.457 <.001
.246 0.049 5.056 <.001
.424 0.048 8.739 <.001
.081 0.084 12.934 <.001
.231 0.057 4.066 <.001
ect)
.021 0.439 4.605 <.001
.479 0.173 8.533 <.001
.402 0.212 1.893 .058
.260 0.262 4.809 <.001
.357 0.204 1.749 .080
.327 0.210 1.557 .120
.894 0.447 4.240 <.001
.518 0.113 4.583 <.001
.125 0.196 0.637 .524
.395 0.204 1.930 .054
.266 0.168 1.583 .113
.521 0.151 3.451 <.001
t)
.996 0.436 4.573 <.001
.855 0.088 9.740 <.001
.128 0.079 1.612 .107
.369 0.081 4.546 <.001
.824 0.626 6.105 <.001
.223 0.160 1.389 .165
.648 0.453 3.638 <.001
.895 0.157 5.695 <.001
actor (2 levels: strong, weak). WithBet = within/between factor (2 levels:
umber4, number6, but restricted to number4, number6 for lexical boost
r4, someM number6, number4M number6). PrimeCat = priming category
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icant between-category priming effect, b = 0.52, p < .001.
However, we also observed significantly greater priming
within number4M number6 than within someM num-
ber6, b = 0.52, p < .001, and numerically greater priming
within number4M number6 than someM number4,
b = 0.27, p = .11.4 Furthermore, priming within num-
ber4M number6 was greater than priming within a com-
bined quantifier-number group (someM number4 trials
and someM number6 trials), as shown by the interaction
between prime and quantifier-number, b = 0.22,
p < .0014. Thus overall, priming within the number scale
was greater than priming across the quantifier number
scales, even when the lexical expressions were different in
both groups. We discuss the significance of this in the
discussion.
We also wanted to establish whether there was a lexical
boost to the priming effect. We tested this by comparing
the priming effect of the within-category number trials
(number4M number4 combined with number6M num-
ber6) against the between-category number trials, (num-
ber4M number6) with within/between (2 levels: within,
between) and prime (2 levels: strong, weak) as factors with
sum contrasts. This analysis revealed a greater priming
effect for within-category number trials than between cat-
egory number trials, as shown by the significant interac-
tion, b = 0.37, p < .001.
Finally, we assessed the image-similarity account of the
within-category priming effect. There were two predic-
tions, both relating to the number4 target. The first was
that participants should have chosen the weak picture
more often after the strong number6 prime trial than after
the strong number4 trial. We therefore compared number4
target responses after a strong number6 compared to a
strong number4 trial, with prime category (number6,
number4) as a factor. In contrast to the image similarity
hypothesis we failed to find to such an effect, b = 0.22,
p = 0.17. The second prediction was that participants
should have chosen the weak picture equally often after
the weak number4 prime as after the strong number6
prime. Here again, we found evidence against the image-
similarity account: for number4 target responses, the
strong number6 prime led to significantly greater rates of
enrichment than the weak number4 prime, M = 0.70
(SD = 0.46) vs M = 0.55 (SD = 0.50), b = 0.90, p < .001.Discussion
Just as in Experiment 1, our findings show that enrich-
ment can be primed. We found within-category priming,4 Testing the effect of prime on each between-category group separately
showed that there was a significant effect of prime on number4M num-
ber6, b = 0.45, p < .001, someM number4, b = .50, p < .001, but not
someM number6, b = 0.12, p = .35. We cannot say for sure why
someM number6 did not demonstrate a significant priming effect but
the reason might have been that the weak picture for number6 contained
nine elements, which is the same as the number of elements in the some
pictures. This could have caused interference that wasn’t present for the
someM number4 group. Alternatively, the someM number6 result might
be a Type II error, since the interaction between prime and someM num-
ber4, someM number6 is not significant, b = 0.25, p = .09.between-category priming, and greater within-category
priming than between-category priming. The results of
Experiment 2 also categorically rule out the image similar-
ity explanation for the large within-category priming
effect: we observed no difference between conditions
where the image similarity account predicted there would
be; and significant differences where it predicted there
would not be.
We also found a lexical boost to the priming effect, con-
sistent with the syntactic priming literature (e.g., Pickering
& Branigan, 1998). There was a larger priming effect where
numbers were the same (number4M number4, num-
ber6M number6) than when they were different (num-
ber4M number6). However, we also found that the
between number effect (number4M number6) was
greater than quantifierM number effect (someM num-
ber4, someM number6). The latter result demonstrates
the distinction between within-category priming that
shares the same key lexical expression (e.g., some? some,
number4? number4 as in Experiment 1) and within-
category priming that does not (e.g., number4M num-
ber6). There is a thus a lexical boost, and a distinct EVA
boost.
Experiment 3
Sentences with plural nouns intuitively make reference
to more than one object. To see this, consider the sentence
(10a), which feels contradictory:(10) John has chairs in his room; in fact he has
exactly one.The contradiction arises because ‘‘chairs” could be para-
phrased as more than one chair, yet in the second clause
refers to exactly one. However, consider (10b) or (10c), in
which ‘‘chairs” is in a downward entailing context:(10b) John doesn’t have chairs in his room.
(10c) I don’t think John has chairs in his room.In these cases, ‘‘chairs” could not be paraphrased as more
than one chair, since this would incorrectly allow the pos-
sibility that John had one chair in his room. Instead, the
plural is best paraphrased as at least one, which excludes
that John has exactly one chair in his room (or any other
number). Hence in contexts like (10a), plurals seems to
have a strong meaning, more than one, whereas in down-
ward entailing contexts, like (10b) and (10c) they seem
to have a weaker meaning, at least one. There is also psy-
cholinguistic evidence that even in the absence of down-
ward entailing environments the plural is underspecified
for number (Patson & Ferreira, 2009; Patson, George, &
Warren, 2014; Patson & Warren, 2011). For example, Pat-
son et al. used a picture-matching paradigm to show that
participants were just as fast to match a plural noun (e.g.,
apples) with a picture of a single object (an apple), as they
were to match a plural noun with a picture of multiple
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plural noun can generate a sentence representation that
is unspecified for number. While there is no generally
accepted explanation for the apparent paradox in plural
meanings, Spector (2007) and others make an interesting
argument that plurals have a basic meaning corresponding
to at least one, and that the stronger, more than one inter-
pretation is an enrichment derived using alternatives, that
is, an EVA.5
In Experiment 3 we test whether numbers, quantifiers
and plural enrichments prime each other. If they do, this
would suggest that themore than one interpretation of plu-
ral morphology (intuitively the putative meaning) is
derived using some of the same mechanisms as classical
EVAs, consistent with the arguments of Spector (2007)
and others. If they do not, there must be at least some dif-
ferences between the two phenomena (since we have
already shown that overlapping EVA mechanisms can be
primed in general).
The general design was the same as that of Experiment
1 except that we used plural morphology items instead of
ad hoc items. The plural items were of the form, ‘‘There are
[symbol]s”. The strong picture was three symbols consis-
tent with the predicate, the weak picture one symbol con-
sistent with the predicate, and the false picture one
symbol, inconsistent with the predicate. Fig. 3 shows
examples.
Method
Participants
One hundred participants were recruited using Amazon
Turk. Of these, six were removed because they did not
declare English as their native language.
Materials
The number4 and some items were the same as those
used in Experiment 1. Instead of number6 items we
included plural items.
The experimental plural sentences were ‘‘There are
[symbol]s.” Weak plural pictures contained a single sym-
bol and strong plural pictures contained three symbols.
False plural pictures contained a single symbol that did
not match the predicate. Strong and weak prime trials
were constructed in the same way as strong and weak
some and number4 trials. Fig. 3 shows examples.
Filler plural trials involved the alternative, just as with
the some and number4 trials. This was implemented as,
‘‘There is a single [symbol].” The construction of
these items followed the same three formats as for the
some and number4 trials described in Experiment 1. The5 In this particular case, one needs to assume that a plural such as
‘‘chairs” has as an alternative meaning something like ‘‘a unique chair”, so
that its negation (not a unique chair) yields the plural meaning. One
challenge is to explain where this complex alternative comes from. We
need not dive into this question here, but note that current accounts
typically assume that this alternative is itself obtained as the enriched
meaning of another, simpler expression (a singular DP). The relevance of
this is that it makes EVAs associated with plurals special in at least one
respect: they show up as a kind of second order EVA (just like free choice,
see e.g., Fox, 2006).remainder of the design and procedure was identical to
Experiment 1.
Results
Data treatment
278 trials out of 6825 responses were removed. Of
these, 107 were number4 trials, 38 were plurals, and 133
were some trials.
Analysis
Fig. 5 shows the data from Experiment 3. As with the
previous experiments, there was a large difference
between strong and weak primes for within-category tri-
als. There is also a large between-category priming effect
between some and number4 but a much smaller
between-category effect involving the plurals.
The overview analysis revealed a significant effect of
prime, b = 0.65, p < .001, of within/between, b = 0.30,
p < .001, and the interaction between them, b = 0.62,
p < .001 (see Table 3 for the statistical details). Similarly,
the simple effects analysis showed a significant within-
category priming effect, b = 1.27, p < .001. However, there
was no significant between-category priming effect,
b = 0.033, p = 0.50. This would be expected if there were
no priming between plural items and quantifier/numbers,
as we probe in more detail below.
The within-category priming results were similar to
other experiments. The effect of prime was significant
overall, b = 1.27, p < .001, and the rate of enrichment dif-
fered across categories such that the plurals were enriched
more often than number4, b = 0.68, p < .001, and margin-
ally more than some, b = 0.51, p = .012, but some and num-
ber4 did not differ, b = 0.17, p = .44. There was also an
interaction such that the effect of the prime was larger
on the plural items than the number4 items, b = 0.51,
p < .001, but not larger on the plural than the some items,
b = 0.29, p = .12, nor was there a difference between some
and number4 categories, b = 0.22, p = .25.
The between category analysis used between category
group (someM number4, pluralM number4 and plu-
ralM some) and prime (strong, weak) as factors in the
model. This analysis revealed no significant effect of prime,
b = 0.10, p = .23, consistent with the overview model, but
there were significant interactions between prime and
between-category groups. Treatment coding of between
category group revealed that the effect of prime was
greater on someM number4 than on pluralM number4,
b = 0.30, p = .0080, and greater on someM number4 than
pluralM some, b = 0.28, p = .017, while there was no differ-
ence between the prime on someM plural and on plu-
ralM number4, b = 0.028, p = .81. In short, the effects of
the prime were larger when priming did not involve the
plural trials than when it did. As a further test of this we
combined the plural trials (pluralM some and plu-
ralM number) and compared them with non-plural trials
(someM number4), in a model with plural and prime as
factors (summed contrasts). This showed the expected
interaction of prime by plural, b = 0.16, p = .0020. Simple
effects analysis showed a significant effect of prime on
non-plurals (someM number4), b = 1.09, p < .001, but no
Fig. 5. Experiment 3 results. See Fig. 2 for explanation.
Table 3
Experiment 3 results.
b S.E. Z p-value
Overview Prime ⁄WithBet + (1 + Prime ⁄WithBet|subject)
(Intercept) 0.917 0.267 3.433 <.001
Prime 0.650 0.048 13.523 <.001
WithBet 0.295 0.041 7.176 <.001
Prime: WithBet 0.618 0.054 11.484 <.001
Within simple Prime 1.267 0.089 14.245 <.001
Between simple Prime 0.033 0.049 0.668 .504
Within detail Prime ⁄WithCat + (1 + Prime ⁄WithCat|subject)
(Intercept) 0.445 0.324 1.375 .169
Prime 1.174 0.164 7.141 <.001
WithCatPLURALS 0.679 0.200 3.392 <.001
WithCatSOME 0.171 0.220 0.777 .437
Prime: WithCatPLURALS 0.506 0.177 2.863 .004
Prime: WithCatSOME 0.223 0.192 1.160 .246
Between detail Prime ⁄ BetCat + (1 + Prime ⁄ BetCat|subject)
(Intercept) 1.408 0.311 4.534 <.001
Prime 0.104 0.087 1.196 .232
BetCatSOMENUM4 0.325 0.145 2.237 .025
BetCatSOMEPURALS 0.260 0.174 1.490 .136
Prime:BetCat SOMENUM4 0.303 0.114 2.656 .008
Prime:BetCatSOMEPURALS 0.028 0.117 0.243 .808
Plurals vs non-plurals Prime ⁄ BetPls + (1 + Prime ⁄ BetPls|subject)
(Intercept) 1.278 0.298 4.284 <.001
Prime 0.047 0.054 0.868 .385
BetPls 0.192 0.063 3.047 .002
Prime:BetPls 0.157 0.051 3.085 .002
Plural simple Prime 0.110 0.069 1.587 .113
Non-plural simple Prime 1.086 0.301 3.610 <.001
Note. R-pseudo code shown in the first line of every section. Prime = priming factor (2 levels: strong, weak). WithBet = within/between factor (2 levels:
within, between). WithCat =within expression category factor (3 levels: some, number4, plurals). Betcat = between expression category factor (3 levels:
someM number4, someM plurals, number4M plurals). BetPls = plurals factor (2 levels: plural combinations, non-plural combinations).
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ralM number4), b = 0.11, p = .11. Overall we find no evi-
dence that plurals and some/number prime each other.Discussion
The primary goal of this experiment was to test
whether the numbers and the quantifiers share enrich-
ment mechanisms with plural morphology. Our evidence
suggests that there are at least some mechanisms used
by some and the numbers that are not shared with plurals.
While we found as much within-category priming for the
plural items as some and the numbers (indeed more than
for the numbers), we found significantly less between-
category priming between plurals and numbers/quanti-
fiers than between quantifiers and numbers. We also
observed robust between category priming between quan-
tifiers and numbers, but none between quantifiers/num-
bers and plurals. These findings argue against equating
the derivation of plural morphology interpretation with
the derivation of classical EVAs (we consider this conclu-
sion in more detail in the General discussion).
The results of Experiment 3 nonetheless provide infor-
mation about what sort of mechanism is being primed
between the numbers and quantifiers (and indirectly the
ad hocs). In particular, it eliminates the possibility that
the only source of between-category priming was that par-
ticipants were being primed to derive the most informative
interpretation of the sentence (or, equivalently, the most
exact, or precise, interpretation). Perhaps people have a
general bias towards weak interpretations (which are gen-
erally more likely to be true) and the prime gave them suf-
ficient confidence in the speaker’s knowledge to select the
strong interpretation. This is plausible because there is
independent evidence that children, in particular, favor
interpretations that make a statement true in a context
(Crain & Thornton, 1998) and that people are generally
sensitive to the informativeness of sentences independent
of whether they derive an enrichment (Katsos & Bishop,
2011). However, in our experiment, the strong and weak
interpretations of the plural items also formed an informa-
tiveness scale. If the between-category priming results
between the numbers and quantifiers were due to priming
of informativeness, we should have observed the same
level of priming between numbers and quantifiers as
between numbers/quantifiers and the plurals, which we
did not. Instead, we must have been priming something
specific to EVAs, rather than to informativeness in general.Combined analysis of Experiments 1–3
We tested priming between some and four in all three
experiments. Since sampling issues are likely to be mini-
mal here (we used repeated measures manipulations
throughout) we combined the experiments to create a lar-
ger (and more powerful) data set. We then used this data
to investigate two further questions about how partici-
pants were completing our task.
The first was whether the direction of priming was
important, that is, whether some? number4 results in dif-ferent priming effects than number4? some. Despite sim-
ilarities, some differences remain between these two types
of EVA: the EVA with numbers is harder to cancel and
occurs more easily in a wider variety of linguistic environ-
ments than the EVA with some does. These differences may
be tied to the way the alternatives are retrieved, such that
retrieving the alternative of some would be a strictly more
complex process than retrieving those for four, for
instance. If this were the case, and if the between priming
effect occurs at the level of this alternative retrieval pro-
cess, then we could expect the priming to be asymmetrical.
The second question we asked was whether the priming
effect differed between the first and the second half of our
experiments. This could tell us how task dependent our
effects were. For example, if the effects existed only in
the second half, one might argue that participants needed
to be ‘‘taught” (through repeated exposure) to understand
one or other of the sentence meanings.
Analysis and discussion
Combining all three experiments resulted in a data set
with N = 377 participants. The results are shown in Fig. 6.
We first conducted an overview analysis with prime (weak,
strong) and within/between as factors, as in previous anal-
yses. This revealed the expected significant effects of
prime, b = 0.60, p < .001, within/between, b = 0.20,
p < .001, and the interaction, b = 0.48, p < .001 (Table 4
shows the statistical details). Simple effects analysis
showed a significant effect of prime at the within category
level, b = 1.08, p < .001, and the between category level,
b = 0.12, p < .001, replicating our previous findings.
Next we assessed the directional effects in the between
category data. We constructed a model with prime (strong,
weak) and direction (number4? some, some? number4)
as fixed effects, using sum coding, and applied the model
to the between-category data. This showed a significant
effect of prime, b = 0.30, p < .001, no effect of direction,
b = .060, p = .43, and no interaction, b = .073, p = .13. Fur-
thermore, the simple effect of prime was significant for
number4? some trials, b = 0.22, p < .001, and for some?
number4 trials, b = 0.35, p < .001. In short there was no evi-
dence that some? number4 priming was larger than num-
ber4? some priming, and good evidence that priming
occurred both directions, contrary the alternatives retrie-
val explanation of the between-category priming result.
Finally, we assessed order effects by comparing the first
half of the experiment with the second half. We used a
model similar to the detailed within-category and
between-category analyses shown in the individual exper-
iment analyses. For within-category priming, we used
prime (2 levels: strong, weak), within-category group (2
levels: some, number4) and half (2 levels: first half, second
half) as sum contrasted factors. There was a significant
effect of prime, b = 1.43, p < .001, but also an interaction
between prime and half, b = .21, p < .001. However, analy-
sis of prime using data restricted to the second half only
showed a significant effect of prime, b = 1.29, p < .001, as
it did for data restricted to the first half only, b = 1.49,
p < .001. Thus while there was a slightly smaller effect of
prime in the second half, effects were present in both. This
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Fig. 6. Combined analysis across Experiments 1, 2 and 3. The strong and weak bars refer to the value of the prime, as in previous experiments. The panel rows
of the figure refer to the prime category (some or number4), and the panel columns the target category (some or number4). Thus, the upper to lower
diagonal shows within-expression trials and the lower to upper diagonal show between-expression trials.
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reduced when we try to continuously alternate between
opposite priming directions.
For between-category data, we used prime (2 levels:
strong, weak), between-category group (2 levels:
someM number4, number4M some) and half (2 levels:
first half, second half) as sum contrasted factors. The effect
of prime was significant, b = 0.34, p < .001, and there was
no interaction with half, b = .06, p = .26. Thus there was
no evidence that the effect differed by half.General discussion
Our goal was to investigate the interaction between
shared and distinct EVA mechanisms: are there core mech-
anisms shared by all EVAs, or does enrichment take place
using distinct mechanisms for each linguistic category?
Our results indicate that there are shared EVA mechanisms
for quantifiers, numbers and ad hoc inferences and that the
shared mechanisms are at least partially distinct from the
mechanisms used in plural morphology.Priming of EVAs
We have identified two sorts of EVA priming: within-
category and between-category priming. Neither form
has been reported in the literature previously. Here we dis-
cuss explanations for our effects from the perspective of
the core account of enrichment (described in the
Introduction).Between-category EVA priming
The core account assumes that alternatives are con-
structed, or retrieved, and passed to the processor to be
negated. If the speaker is sufficiently knowledgeable, the
negated alternative is combined with the basic meaning
to form the enriched meaning. Since these mechanisms
are independent of specific EVAs, priming of each could,
in theory, explain the between-category priming effect.
Here we discuss these in more detail.
One possibility is that we were priming perceptions of
how knowledgeable the speaker appears (or judgments
about the mental state of the speaker). The idea would
Table 4
Combined analysis.
b S.E. Z p-value
Overview Prime ⁄WithBet + (1 + Prime ⁄WithBet|subject)
(Intercept) 0.259 0.150 1.728 0.084
Prime 0.601 0.025 24.382 <.001
WithBet 0.196 0.022 9.078 <.001
Prime:WithBet 0.479 0.024 20.024 <.001
Within simple Prime 1.080 0.042 25.524 <.001
Between simple Prime 0.120 0.024 5.064 <.001
Between details Prime ⁄ Direction + (1 + Prime ⁄ Direction|subject)
(Intercept) 0.984 0.208 4.727 <.001
Prime 0.294 0.048 6.099 <.001
Direction 0.060 0.075 0.790 .430
Prime:Direction 0.073 0.048 1.522 .128
Some? number4 Prime 0.354 0.069 5.104 <.001
Number4? some Prime 0.221 0.065 3.412 <.001
Within by half Prime ⁄WithCat ⁄ Half + (1 + Prime ⁄WithCat ⁄ Half | subject)
(Intercept) 0.473 0.192 2.462 .014
Prime 1.425 0.077 18.601 <.001
WithCat 0.235 0.073 3.208 .001
Half 0.145 0.062 2.355 .019
Prime: WithCat 0.177 0.063 2.806 .005
Prime:Half 0.212 0.056 3.787 <.001
WithCat:Half 0.108 0.060 1.789 .074
Prime:WithCat:Half 0.079 0.057 1.394 .163
Half 1 only (Intercept) 0.531 0.188 2.829 .005
Prime 1.488 0.086 17.222 <.001
WithCat 0.183 0.091 2.012 .044
Prime: WithCat 0.063 0.080 0.790 .430
Half 2 only (Intercept) 0.423 0.211 2.001 .045
Prime 1.295 0.091 14.260 <.001
WithCat 0.153 0.082 1.879 .060
Prime: WithCat 0.134 0.074 1.817 .069
Between by half Prime ⁄ BetCat ⁄ Half + (1 + Prime ⁄ BetCat ⁄ Half |subject)
(Intercept) 1.096 0.240 4.557 <.001
Prime 0.344 0.056 6.182 <.001
BetCat 0.027 0.086 0.315 .753
Half 0.010 0.084 0.118 .906
Prime: BetCat 0.065 0.055 1.177 .239
Prime:Half 0.060 0.054 1.122 .262
BetCat:Half 0.103 0.063 1.628 .104
Note. R-pseudo code shown in the first line of every section. Factor expressions as in Table 1 except that levels are restricted to some and number4 and their
combinations. Direction = prime-category? target factor (2 levels: some? number4, number4? some). Half = experiment half factor (2 levels: first half,
second half).
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that the speaker is knowledgeable enough to have used
the alternative and consequently derives the enrichment
in the target trial, whereas after a weak prime trial, the
participant is not confident about the speaker’s knowledge,
and so does not derive the enrichment in the target trial.
However, there are several reasons why this seems
implausible. The first is that our manipulation was a
repeated measures design and there is little reason for par-
ticipants to believe that the speaker on strong trials was
different to the speaker on weak trials. We did not present
the speaker differently across prime trials by, for example,
creating one female speaker for strong trials and one male
speaker for weak trials. The strong and weak primes were
presented identically and in sequence, so there was no rea-
son for the participant to distinguish between them. The
second is that it would have been difficult for the partici-
pant to determine that the strong prime speaker was
knowledgeable and that the weak speaker was not, evenif they believed that there were multiple speakers. We
did not use a cover story that manipulated the knowledge
of the speaker (cf. Bergen & Grodner, 2012), nor did we
vary speaker reliability (cf. Grodner & Sedivy, 2011).
Instead, the participant would have had to engage in a
form of backward Gricean reasoning, in which they rea-
soned that because the speaker was obliging them to
derive an enriched interpretation in the strong prime trial,
the speaker must be knowledgeable, whereas because the
speaker did not oblige them to derive an enrichment for
the weak trials, the speaker must not be knowledgeable.
A more plausible explanation is that we were priming
the search for alternatives. On this account, there is a
mechanism that can be primed to retrieve (or construct)
relevant alternatives. Consider how this could explain our
findings. On a strong prime trial the processor would be
unable to provide a categorical response using a weak
interpretation of the EVA expression (both responses
options are consistent with the weak interpretation). This
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ply, ultimately retrieving alternatives to what the speaker
could have said and deriving the enrichment. On a weak
prime trial, the weak interpretation provides a satisfactory
response and there is no need to process the sentence more
deeply. If the search mechanism has activation levels that
retain their value across the inter-trial-interval, activation
levels would be higher following a strong prime than a
weak prime, and the enrichment would be more likely to
arise. Note that this account does not assume that the
alternatives per se are being primed (e.g., all), only that
the search for alternatives is primed.
Finally, our effects could be explained by the mecha-
nism that negates the alternative and combines it with
the basic meaning (a usage mechanism). During a strong
trial, in which enrichment occurs, the usage mechanism
would be activated, whereas in a weak trial, where enrich-
ment does not occur, the usage mechanism would not be
activated. Consequently if the activation levels of the usage
mechanism remain active across trials then the alternative
would more likely be negated after a strong trial than after
a weak trial. Under this account, the usage mechanism is a
distinct mechanism that operates independently of the
general salience of alternatives.
The status of the search and usage mechanisms has not
been considered much in the literature (there has been no
empirical need) but nor is either option inconsistent with
prevailing accounts. In terms of general plausibility, con-
tinuously searching for alternatives is intuitively a costly
activity, especially since those alternatives would not be
used often, and having a mechanism that is triggered only
on certain occasions would reduce the cost. Conversely,
however, the search may not incur a cost if it is part of
the general process of language comprehension. For
instance, the search may be part of incremental prediction
(e.g., Altmann & Kamide, 1999; DeLong, Urbach, & Kutas,
2005; Kutas & Hillyard, 1984), which presumably occurs
all the time, and which would obviate the need for a trigger
mechanism. Furthermore, the lack of between-category
priming with plural items does not distinguish between
the two accounts. If a search mechanism were being
primed, the lack of an effect with plurals could be
explained by a specialized plural search mechanism, and
if a usage mechanism were being primed, by a specialized
plural usage mechanism (or that alternatives were not
used to derive plurals at all). In short, there is little to
choose between the priming of a usage mechanism and a
search mechanism based on our data or from previous
research.
Within-category priming
Priming of the search and usage mechanisms explain
well the between-category priming effects but they offer
no explanation for why we observed a greater within-
category priming effect than a between-category priming
effect. If all that was being primed was the use of alterna-
tives, say, we should have observed the same magnitude of
within-category priming effect as between-category prim-
ing effect, which we did not. Additional mechanisms are
therefore required to explain the elevated within-
category effect. These are discussed below.It is possible that participants were primed to accept
different degrees of informativity (or precision). As we sug-
gested in Experiment 3, people might have a bias towards
weak interpretations (which are generally more likely to
be true) and the strong prime gave them sufficient confi-
dence in the speaker’s knowledge to select the strong
interpretation; or perhaps they are generally accepting of
imprecise interpretations (the weak target) unless they
have a reason to think that the speaker is being particularly
exact (in which case they reject the weak target in favor of
the better picture option). While the results of Experiment
3 eliminate this explanation of between-category priming,
they do not do so for within-category priming. However,
many of the arguments against priming of speaker beliefs
that we made in the Between-category priming section
are equally applicable here. Priming people to accept dif-
ferent degrees of informativeness requires them to judge
that the speaker has different communicative require-
ments across trials (within the same experiment), or that
there are different speakers across trials. Neither possibil-
ity seems plausible given that strong and weak prime trials
were identical in presentation. Furthermore, if we were
priming acceptance of informativity across within-
category trials, we should have observed an equally large
effect in the between-category priming trials, since in both
conditions the weak interpretation was less informative
than the strong interpretation. That we observed a much
larger within-category effect than between-category effect
argues against this explanation.
An alternative is that within-category priming could be
explained by links between the trigger expressions and the
derivation mechanisms. In the case of some, for example,
there might be a link between some and the usage mecha-
nism, so that repeated application of the usage mechanism
while some is activated leads to a strengthening of the link
between them. In other words within-category priming is
lexical in nature. While there might be a lexical contribu-
tion to the within-category priming effect we doubt that
it entirely explains the result, however. With some, the
explanation seems plausible but with the other expressions
we used, the numbers and the ad hoc EVAs, it is far less so.
With numbers we observed a larger priming effect when
the same number was used across prime and target (e.g.,
number4? number4) compared to when different numbers
were used (number4M number6). This is indeed evidence of
a lexical priming effect. However, we also observed greater
priming when different numbers were used (num-
ber4M number6) than when a number and some was used
(someM number4, someM number6). This suggests that
in addition to a lexical effect, there is a within-EVA effect
that is non-lexical in nature. Finally, while the ad hoc items
involved the samewords in each case, ‘‘There is a [symbol]”,
it seems unlikely that any one of them had pre-existing
links to a usage mechanism since each of the words occur
in many linguistic environments that do not generate
enrichments (indeed, this is whatmakes them ad hoc EVAs).
Onewould have to assume that ‘‘There is a” became lexical-
ized during the experiment and developed a link to the
usage mechanism, which could then be primed.
A more likely explanation is that the primes altered the
saliency of specific alternatives. A strong prime trial would
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weak prime trial would not. In the case of some, for exam-
ple, all would be more salient after a strong prime than a
weak prime. (For other categories, such as the ad hoc trials,
the activated alternative would have to have a more
abstract form). If the alternative remained highly active
across trials, and if a salient alternative facilitated enrich-
ment, more enrichment would be expected after strong
primes than weak primes. The same effect would not be
present in between-category priming trials because the
alternatives would be different across trials.
Summary
Our results illustrate that enrichment depends on
whether the immediate context includes prior enrichment.
We have suggested different ways in which this can be
explained within the framework of the core account, and
expressed preferences as to the more plausible among
them. In particular, we argue that (1) enrichment raises
the saliency of alternatives, which leads to more enrich-
ment and (2) enrichment primes either a search mecha-
nism or a usage mechanism (or both), which also leads to
enrichment.
Implications for theories of individual EVAs
Our experiments were not intended to address individ-
ual theories about enrichment but they nonetheless have
implications for several debates in the literature. We dis-
cuss these below.
EVA vs exact accounts of numbers
Recall from the introduction that there are divergent
theories of number representation. According to EVA
accounts (Gazdar, 1979; Horn 1989; Levinson, 1983), num-
bers have a weak semantic representation (e.g., ‘‘four of the
symbols are squares” means at least four of the symbols are
squares) combined with an enrichment derivation of the
strong interpretation, whereas exact accounts (e.g.,
Breheny, 2008; Geurts, 2006), favor a strong semantic
meaning (e.g., ‘‘four of the symbols are squares” means
exactly four of the symbols are squares) with a secondary
weak meaning. Our data most straightforwardly provide
evidence consistent with an EVA account of number
expressions: numbers and quantifiers both have the weak
meaning as basic, and both have the strong meaning
derived using alternatives. Since they have the same sort
of semantic representation and derivation mechanism,
activation from one EVA category in a prime should lead
to activation in the other EVA category in the target,
exactly as we observed. Under the exact view, in contrast,
numbers and quantifiers have a different sort of semantic
representation and a different derivation. There is there-
fore no straightforward reason why activation of the mech-
anisms in one category would lead to activation of the
mechanisms in the other category.
One way of reconciling our results with previous stud-
ies is to argue that observed differences between numbers
and other types of EVAs (e.g., Guasti et al., 2005; Huang
et al., 2013; Marty, Chemla, & Spector, 2013; Musolino,
2004; Papafragou & Musolino, 2003) arise for peripheralreasons. For instance, it could be that number enrichment
is an easier task than some enrichment for independent
reasons (just like apparently irrelevant factors can affect
the difficulty of some reasoning tasks e.g., Johnson-Laird
& Bara, 1984; Newstead, Pollard, & Allen, 1992). As a con-
sequence, exact readings of numerals may be accessed
more easily and more broadly, but yet through the same
mechanisms as other EVAs. In the long run, one could hope
to reconcile the processing differences and the priming
similarities more ambitiously, possibly finding for instance
that processing delays are caused by computation difficul-
ties under certain circumstances (present for some but not
for numbers), and priming effects are based on the activa-
tion of a common set of mechanisms, independently of
their difficulties.
Plural morphology
We did not observe a priming effect between plurals
and other EVAs. Given the consistency of between-
priming effects throughout the other categories of EVAs,
the resistance of plurals to enter into these priming effects
challenges recent accounts that attempt to unify plural
morphology with other triggers of EVAs (e.g., Spector,
2007). We see two ways to go about this new finding. First,
one may abandon the EVA account of plurals. Second, less
trivially, one may like to capitalize on some aspects of the
EVA accounts of plurals that make them different from
others and investigate whether these peculiarities play a
key role in priming. There are several possibilities. The first
is that plurals might use the same core mechanisms as
some/numbers (derivation of the alternative and its nega-
tion) but to different degrees: Plurals may require the
repeated application of the core mechanisms whereas
some/numbers may require only a single application (e.g.,
in Spector (2007), plurals rely on strengthened alternatives,
which themselves require deriving enriched meanings,
whereas classical EVAs rely on simple alternatives, which
do not). Plurals might therefore be more difficult to prime
than classical EVAs but use the same processes. Another
possibility is that the alternatives for plurals might be
derived in a different way to the alternatives for some/
numbers. For example, plural alternatives may involve
deletion of the plural morpheme, rather than replacement
of a lexical item, which happens to make a difference
according to Katzir’s (2007) view of alternatives. If the
between-category priming effect in some/numbers arises
because the mechanism that derives the alternatives is
primed, no priming effect would be predicted if plurals
use a different method of generating the alternative to
some/numbers (even though plurals might share some of
the remaining EVA mechanisms).
Overall then, our failure to find priming effects between
plurals and the classical EVAs shows that the two phenom-
ena do not share exactly the same set of mechanisms for
their derivation, but they may nonetheless share some of
the them, which are not the locus of priming effects. In
the future, a better understanding of the locus of the prim-
ing effects could help locate the similarities and differences
between plurals and other forms of EVAs. For instance,
testing priming of plurals and some/number EVA with
other appropriately chosen phenomena (e.g., free choice
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ened alternatives) would clarify whether plurals use any of
the same mechanisms as classical EVAs.
Ad hoc EVAs
Hirschberg (1991) and others have suggested that ad
hoc enrichments arise by negating alternatives and com-
bining them with the basic meaning, much like quantifiers
and numbers. The between-category priming effects that
we observed largely support this conclusion. Nonetheless,
ad hoc EVAs were different in one respect: they exhibited
substantially lower rates of overall enrichment than the
other EVAs. Presumably the alternatives for the ad hoc
EVAs were less available than those for the other EVAs.
We suggest that this was caused by the relative com-
plexity of the ad hoc alternatives. While the alternatives
for quantifiers and numbers were formed by substituting
a single term for another (e.g., ‘‘all” for ‘‘some”), those for
ad hoc EVAs required deriving extra material with mean-
ingful content. For example, the alternative to ‘‘There is a
diamond,” was the conjunctive expression, ‘‘There is a dia-
mond and a square.” The extra material presumably
requires more work from the processor relative to a simple
substitution. Consequently the processor would fail a
greater number of times in retrieving ad hoc alternatives
compared to quantifier or number alternatives, and thus
the enrichment would also fail on greater number of occa-
sions. Such an account would be consistent with the views
of theorists who advocate a role for the source of lexical
material available for the replacement (e.g., again, Katzir,
2007) but the psychological claim – that the complexity
of the alternative at least partially determines the rate of
enrichment – remains to be tested.
Enrichment and structural priming
We have so far presented enrichment priming as being
quite different to other sorts of structural priming reported
in the literature. However, there are similarities and differ-
ences between the two that are profitable to consider.
Mechanisms vs representations
The structural priming literature typically refers to
structures and representations, whereas we have described
the standard account in terms of mechanisms for alterna-
tive retrieval and manipulation. While these two
approaches appear to be quite different, EVAs could be
seen as meaning-based representations (something like
an EVA logical form) that can be primed (rather like
Raffray and Pickering’s (2010), account of scopal ambiguity
priming). For example, the processor might represent two
EVA structures, one for the strong interpretation and one
for the weak interpretation:
(R1) X but not Alt[X]
(R2) X (and either Alt[X] or not Alt[X])
Where X corresponds to the EVA trigger and Alt[X] the
alternatives to X. (In the recent grammatical version of the
core account, as in Chierchia et al. (2012), the distinction
may be more transparently linked to representational dif-ferences: R1 would correspond to a parse of the sentence
containing the silent exhaustification operator O, and R2
would be a parse without this operator). R1 and R2 would
be linked to EVA trigger expressions, such as some and the
numbers, or particular structures, such as There is a [sym-
bol] (the ad hoc structure), so that processing of these
expressions would trigger the activation of both represen-
tations. The interaction between within and between-
category priming would arise because during within-
category trials, the appropriate enrichment representation
retains elevated activation from the previous trial, and also
receives a boost from the elevated activation on the trigger
link, whereas during between-category trials, it is only the
activation on the representation that contributes to enrich-
ment (similar to Pickering and Branigan’s (1998), explana-
tion of lexical boost and syntactic priming).
Because priming effects in syntax have been linked to a
representational view of syntax, one may thus investigate
what would be the properties of a similar representational
view of the priming effects we find for EVAs. By analogy
with the syntactic priming literature, it may assume a level
of representation intermediate between individual words
and whole sentences at which we can recognize the phe-
nomenon: in this view it is the activation of partial chunks,
stored as such in the lexicon, which generate the priming
effects. Here, for instance, these chunks could involve a
combination of an exhaustivity operator (e.g., van Rooij
and Schultz, 2004; Chierchia, 2004) and an enrichment
trigger. Also, the representational view of priming typically
assumes that there is no default as to which possible chunk
is activated, in common with constraint-based models of
language (Elman, Hare, & McRae, 2004; McRae, Spivey-
Knowlton, & Tanenhaus, 1998). Whether these properties
accurately reflect the behavior of EVAs remains to be seen
(e.g., Tomlinson et al. (2013), present data against a
straightforward constraint-based model of EVAs, although
Degen and Tanenhaus (2015), show evidence in favor) but
presenting EVAs as representations at least allows the sim-
ilarities (and differences) between EVA priming and other
forms of priming to be more apparent. In the much longer
run, it could help nurture the debate about the semantic/
pragmatic status of EVAs.
Inverse preference effect
In the syntactic priming literature there is evidence that
the less preferred syntactic construction is a more effective
prime that the more preferred structure (the inverse prefer-
ence effect; Hartsuiker & Kolk, 1998; Hartsuiker, Kolk, &
Huiskamp, 1990; Hartsuiker & Westenberg, 2000;
Scheepers, 2003). In other words, structures that are more
surprising are stronger primes than those that are less sur-
prising. For example, English passives, which are less fre-
quent than active structures, produce strong priming
effects, but active passives do not (e.g., Bock, 1986). The
inverse preference effect has been used to argue that prim-
ing is based on prediction error (Chang, Dell, & Bock, 2006;
Fine & Jaeger, 2013; Jaeger & Snider, 2013). The basic idea
is that people adjust their expectations about upcoming
linguistic structure by minimizing the error between the
predicted and observed linguistic structure. Since dispre-
ferred structures result in larger prediction error, the pre-
Table A1
Raw cell means.
Prime
category
Target
category
Prime
value
Proportion
strong
response
S.E
Experiment
1
ADHOC ADHOC Strong 0.410 0.019
ADHOC ADHOC Weak 0.215 0.015
ADHOC NUM4 Strong 0.542 0.019
ADHOC NUM4 Weak 0.497 0.019
ADHOC SOME Strong 0.515 0.019
ADHOC SOME Weak 0.492 0.019
NUM4 ADHOC Strong 0.319 0.018
NUM4 ADHOC Weak 0.283 0.017
NUM4 NUM4 Strong 0.615 0.018
NUM4 NUM4 Weak 0.339 0.018
NUM4 SOME Strong 0.553 0.019
NUM4 SOME Weak 0.484 0.019
SOME ADHOC Strong 0.343 0.019
SOME ADHOC Weak 0.301 0.017
SOME NUM4 Strong 0.544 0.020
SOME NUM4 Weak 0.474 0.019
SOME SOME Strong 0.604 0.019
SOME SOME Weak 0.340 0.018
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quent trials will be adjusted more than the prediction asso-
ciated with the preferred structures. Furthermore, because
learning by minimization of prediction error is assumed to
be implicit (rather than episodic), the inverse preference
effect has also been used as evidence that priming is an
implicit learning effect (Pickering & Ferreira, 2008). Do
the priming effects we observe also exhibit the inverse
preference effect?
Establishing this is somewhat complicated because we
do not have a priori neutral prime trials against which we
could compare preferred and dispreferred primes. Indeed,
our hypothesis was that all of the EVA categories would
prime all of the others. However, in Experiment 3 we did
not observe significant between-category priming between
plural trials and quantifiers/numbers. Thus the plural
primes could act as a neutral control prime (a baseline)
for quantifiers/numbers and vice versa. This would suggest
that baseline responses for enrichment in plurals were
73%, for quantifiers 63%, and for numbers 59%. That these
numbers are all above 50% confirms the intuition that the
strong interpretation is the preferred sense in each case
(see Grodner et al. (2010), for evidence that the strong
interpretation of some of is the preferred sense, and
reviews of the semantics of number terms for evidence
that the strong interpretation of bare numerals is the pre-
ferred sense). To test whether we had an inverse prefer-
ence effect we therefore compared the target following
the strong prime (preferred) and the weak prime (dispre-
ferred) to the appropriate baseline using a one sample t-
test. For plurals, the weak prime caused mean enrichment
that was significantly different from baseline, M = 0.44
(SD = 0.38), t(93) = 7.45, p < .001, but the strong prime did
not, M = 0.77 (SD = 0.34), t < 1. The magnitude of the prim-
ing effect was significantly different across conditions, t
(93) = 3.69, p < .001. Thus for plurals there was a robust
inverse preference priming effect. For quantifiers, the
weakly primed target was significantly different to base-
line, M = 0.41 (SD = 0.39), t(93) = 5.41, p < .001, and the
strong prime was marginally different to baseline,
M = 0.72 (SD = 0.37), t(93) = 1.90, p = .061. Here again, the
priming effect was significantly different across strong
and weak conditions, t(93) = 1.99, p = .050, illustrating an
inverse preference effect. Finally, for numbers, the weakly
primed target differed to baseline, M = 0.43 (SD = 0.39), t
(93) = 4.14, p < .001, and the strongly primed target dif-
fered marginally, M = 0.66 (SD = 0.40), t(93) = 1.74,
p = .084, but the effect did not differ significantly across
conditions t(93) = 1.28, p = .20. Overall then we observed
the inverse preference effect for within-category priming
in plural items and quantifier items, but not the number
items.
Finding an inverse preference effect in our data is useful
for a variety of reasons. The first is that our study uses dif-
ferent linguistic phenomena and somewhat different pro-
cedures to other priming studies and it is comforting that
we replicate the effects of more established paradigms. It
suggests that using the ‘‘better picture” option, for exam-
ple, does not result in a radically different form of priming
than the more standard double-picture target (e.g., Raffray
& Pickering, 2010). The second is that we extend the rangeof priming phenomena that display the inverse preference
effect. Previous work has tested inverse priming in syntac-
tic representations (e.g., Fine & Jaeger, 2013; Hartsuiker &
Kolk, 1998; Hartsuiker et al., 1990; Hartsuiker &
Westenberg, 2000; Scheepers, 2003) whereas our research
has demonstrated the effect in meaning-based representa-
tions. While it would be surprising if there was a funda-
mental difference between how syntactic and meaning-
based representations were learned and used, our results
suggest that meaning-based phenomena, such as EVAs,
might be successfully simulated using error-based connec-
tionist models.Conclusion
Our aim was to better understand how people use alter-
natives to enrich the basic meaning of a sentence. In this
respect our study makes three important contributions.
(1) We demonstrate that enrichment typically thought as
semantic or pragmatic can be primed in the same way syn-
tactic properties, say, can be primed through structural
priming. Models of enrichment that aim to be psychologi-
cally plausible must therefore incorporate this property
into their architecture. (2) We provide data that informs
theories of individual EVAs. For example, our data chal-
lenge theories of exact number semantics (e.g., Breheny,
2008; Geurts, 2006) and EVA accounts of plurals (e.g.,
Spector, 2007). (3) We show that there are mechanisms
that are shared across different EVAs, and that some phe-
nomena (e.g., plurals) are excluded from this class. This
constrains the range of models necessary to explain how
people reason with alternatives.Appendix A
See Table A1.
Table A1 (continued)
Prime
category
Target
category
Prime
value
Proportion
strong
response
S.E
Experiment
2
NUM4 NUM4 Strong 0.755 0.022
NUM4 NUM4 Weak 0.549 0.027
NUM4 NUM6 Strong 0.707 0.024
NUM4 NUM6 Weak 0.587 0.026
NUM4 SOME Strong 0.664 0.025
NUM4 SOME Weak 0.642 0.026
NUM6 NUM4 Strong 0.698 0.024
NUM6 NUM4 Weak 0.624 0.026
NUM6 NUM6 Strong 0.709 0.024
NUM6 NUM6 Weak 0.550 0.027
NUM6 SOME Strong 0.667 0.025
NUM6 SOME Weak 0.667 0.026
SOME NUM4 Strong 0.710 0.024
SOME NUM4 Weak 0.668 0.025
SOME NUM6 Strong 0.675 0.025
SOME NUM6 Weak 0.652 0.025
SOME SOME Strong 0.713 0.024
SOME SOME Weak 0.458 0.027
Experiment
3
NUM4 NUM4 Strong 0.668 0.025
NUM4 NUM4 Weak 0.422 0.026
NUM4 PLURALS Strong 0.739 0.023
NUM4 PLURALS Weak 0.733 0.024
NUM4 SOME Strong 0.687 0.024
NUM4 SOME Weak 0.631 0.026
PLURALS NUM4 Strong 0.594 0.025
PLURALS NUM4 Weak 0.587 0.026
PLURALS PLURALS Strong 0.774 0.022
PLURALS PLURALS Weak 0.439 0.026
PLURALS SOME Strong 0.636 0.025
PLURALS SOME Weak 0.628 0.025
SOME NUM4 Strong 0.642 0.026
SOME NUM4 Weak 0.568 0.026
SOME PLURALS Strong 0.738 0.024
SOME PLURALS Weak 0.712 0.024
SOME SOME Strong 0.730 0.024
SOME SOME Weak 0.413 0.026
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